Persistent states: the planning and development of Sydney's fringe

Kristian J. Ruming and Nicole Cook
1City Futures Research Centre, Faculty of the Built Environment, The University of New South Wales
2Department of Human Geography, Macquarie University

Abstract: Over the past two decades there has been increasing concern over the rise of neoliberal governance. While some researchers are ultimately concerned with the prevalence or spread of neoliberalism; others are attendant to the uneven and multiple ways in which neoliberal projects are realised. Within this framework, the place of large-scale residential property development in Australia occupies an ambiguous place. Drawing on two cases of large-scale residential property development in NSW (Warnervale Town Centre and ADI-St Marys), this paper situates residential development in relation to planning trajectories in NSW and orients this form towards hybrid forms of neoliberalism. We argue that there has been a recentring of the state in infrastructure and service provision in response to the spatial and temporal specificities in which residential development is enacted.

Introduction
Over the past two decades there has been increasing concern over the rise of neoliberal governance in western nations (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a; Peck & Tickell, 2002). At its heart neoliberalism champions reduced state spending and regulatory roles, privatisation and modifications to the welfare state. Exploring the nature of these changes has been one of the key concerns of economic and urban geographers, where, for the most part, it is assumed that the retreat of the state does not happen instantaneously, rather that it is mediated locally and that it hinges on the intersection of competing scales and competing states. Yet while some researchers are ultimately concerned with the prevalence or spread of neoliberalism (see Peck & Tickell, 2002); others are attendant to the uneven and multiple ways in which neoliberal projects are realised (O’Neill & Argent, 2005; McGuirk, 2003; 2005). It is this second research trajectory to which this paper contributes.

A number of scholars have argued that cities have become crucial arenas in which neoliberal policies have unfolded (Brenner & Theodore, 2002b). Cities have become central to the reproduction, mutation and reconstitution of neoliberalism. Further, their suburban fringes have become the laboratories for numerous neoliberal policy experiments (Brenner & Theodore, 2002b). However, the place of large-scale residential property development in Australia occupies an ambiguous place. Current research positions housing provision as an increasingly privatised activity (Troy, 1999; Morison, 2000; Gleeson & Low, 2000). Yet in urban research more broadly, there is growing evidence that the state continues to play a critical role in achieving equitable urban outcomes. Thus, it seems pertinent to consider the state-market relations underpinning suburban and inter-urban growth in more detail.

To these ends, we first explore neoliberalism as an economic and management paradigm. Second we provide a round-up of current research in relation to housing provision in New South Wales (NSW). The third section looks in detail at two of the largest land release areas in the Sydney Greater Metropolitan Region; Warnervale, located in the Wyong Shire on the Central Coast, 78 kilometres north of the CBD, and the Australian Defence Industry site St Marys (ADI-St Marys), which straddles the border between Blacktown and Penrith Council areas in western Sydney, 44 kilometres from the CBD. Some conclusions are then drawn.

Theorising neoliberalism
At its core, neoliberalism represents a framework of political and economic authority which champions market operation and efficiency over a wide range of social relations (Brenner & Theodore, 2002b). As a guiding principle, neoliberalism seeks to remove the state centred bureaucracy and executive characteristic of the socio-democratic tradition of Keynesianism, and in its place position the market at the centre of public management (Larner, 2000). Australia is considered to be one of a number of market-liberal societies where the idea of the market has been positioned as the preferred mechanism in the allocation of goods and services, with individualism, rather than communitarianism, the social norm (McGuirk & O’Neill, 2002).

In conjunction with this shift towards increased market dominance, deregulation and privatisation have become central themes in state restructuring (Larner, 2000). Privatisation can be conceived as a new
emphasis on market provision of formerly ‘public’ goods and services, effectively transferring power away from governments with a mandate to ensure universal service provision towards private capital concerned primarily with furthering opportunities for accumulation (Larner, 2000). This shift towards supply-side interventions has prompted many authors to identify a ‘hollowing-out’ or ‘roll-back’ of the Keynesian-welfare state (Larner, 2000). Despite the monolithic representation of neoliberalism there is an increasing body of work concerned with the nuances of this movement.

Indeed, for a number of theorists (O’Neill, 1997) the state continues to intervene in the market. In these readings there is a mutually conducive process of market and state construction, where neither is hermetically sealed and where recognition of the state as the principal institution in the construction of market operation is vital. Peck & Tickell (2002), for instance, compare the ‘shallow’ neoliberalism of the 1980s (roll-back), with a current era of ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism characterised by ‘proactive statecraft and pervasive “metaregulation”’ (p. 384). Thus, even while states pursue agendas typical of neoliberalism, they are continuing to intervene in the market. Here the decline of the welfare state does not mean the decline of the state. Consequently, there is a shift in the nature rather than a reduction of state intervention.

More fluid still are conceptualisations based on the everyday and ongoing interaction between states and markets, where neoliberalism is seen as an ‘accomplishment’, one that involves grounding relations and patterns of state intervention; and sees them unfolding through different economic, political and cultural contexts (McGuirk, 2005). This body of literature calls for the study of ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’ (Brenner & Theodore, 2002b), where market operations are mediated by the embedded and scaled nature of place, the multiple and contradictory objectives of agents (McGuirk, 2005; Ruming, 2005). These accounts urge a consideration of the ongoing construction of state-market relations under neoliberalism, so that rather than exploring the presence of an emergent neoliberal entity, emphasis should be placed on the extent to which broad neoliberal tendencies [are] recognisable in … lived history and geography’ (O’Neill & Argent, 2005, p. 4).

As such, emphasis should be placed on the embeddedness of policies and markets within national, regional and local contexts (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a). Capitalist restructuring can, therefore, be portrayed as complex political and ideological hybrid, the result of contextually-specific adoption, negotiation and struggle (Brenner & Theodore, 2002b). Thus, it is not simply a question of the ongoing dependence of the market on state support, but whether the persistence of neoliberalism can be explained through this singular, one-way relationship. In this instance neoliberalism is a localised, mediated, temporal and hybrid expression of a plethora of interested actors and processes.

One of the key concerns of hybrid conceptualisations of neoliberalism is the recognition of ‘local-global’ regimes. These theorisations highlight the value of McGuirk’s (1997; 2003) multi-scaled notion of urban governance which offers a more complex understanding of the ways economic, social and political trajectories converge within localities. McGuirk (1997) points then to the convergence of interests across scales not as an inevitability, but a moment where stakeholders respond to different triggers, thus unsettling hegemonic notions of the state and the private sector and asserting instead context, contingency and a plurality of state-market relations.

Large-scale residential property development in Australia
There is an unquestioned withdrawal of the state in (certain parts of) Australian housing and planning policy. Historically, government intervention in residential development was greatest at the end of the Second World War, where housing production became a major element of the broad program of war reconstruction (Berry, 1999). The state used housing as a tool for shaping broader economic activity as a whole, with large areas of housing being developed on the fringe of most of Australia’s capital cities. Much of this housing was developed through direct state construction of public housing, while private developers released land at a profuse rate, leaving the state to construct and fund social services and infrastructure (Troy, 1995). Although such policies may have effectively dealt with post war housing objectives and facilitated the economy of the ‘long boom’, this development soon came under criticism, primarily due to its lack of imaginative planning, stark physical landscape and substandard social reputation.
By the mid-1960s land developers were beginning to contribute to public expenditure on water and sewage for new suburbs (Morison, 2000). This process continued in the 1970s, where Morison (2000) suggests that land developers, as a result of the requirement to outlay substantial funds on land development and public service provision, developed a strong association with planning authorities in an attempt to safeguard their own forward planning of expenditures. In this sense, the Australian development environment was one where developers needed planners even more than planners needed developers (Stein, 1999).

According to Beer et al. (2007), over the last two decades housing and planning policy has been increasingly directed by neoliberal state tendencies. This privatisation agenda in NSW was accelerated in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the release of the Raine Report (Raine, 1988) into housing affordability and the failure of the Coalition government’s Home Fund, and the Mant Report into the functioning of the NSW Department of Housing (Mant, 1992). One of the key recommendations of the Raine Report was a greater reliance on business enterprise to cater for the housing needs of low-income people, while the Mant Report resulted in a major restructure of the Department of Housing, thereby separating its role as a social housing provider and its role as a public, profit oriented developer (Landcom) (Mant, 1992). As a result the Landcom agency moved dramatically from being an affordable housing agency to a mainstream government trading enterprise (Freestone, 2000).

Under the managerialist orientation of the 1990s NSW state, the provision of social infrastructure has become increasingly difficult for government authorities (Caufield, 2000). As a result, instead of attempting to solve the many public sector management problems, there has been an ostensible shift towards a ‘market solution’, in which public services are removed from the government sphere (Gleeson and Low, 2000). Thus, the government moved to ‘distance’ themselves from the financing of services by corporatising them wherever possible (Troy, 1995). This was a new round of privatisation where the state actively pursued market involvement in the co-ordination and provision of housing and employment, direct investment in transport, remediation of brownfield sites, preparation of greenfield sites, and co-ordination of community development and human services delivery (Troy, 1999).

There is little doubt that the challenge to equal urban outcomes posed by privatised, market-oriented planning has fuelled new interest in state roles and responses. For instance, scholars have noted the ways that planning authorities have attempted to re-enter the housing market through increased partnership and master planning functions in order to facilitate the provision of social services and infrastructure to new resident populations (Sagalyn, 1997; Beer et al., 2007). Further, McGuirk (2005) has also shown that despite a focus during the 1980s on market planning strategies, and a move away from distributional outcomes that would ensure the provision of services to all areas of the city, plans with a social democratic flavour nonetheless emerged in NSW.

Recognising the possibility that the state continues to intervene in residential development is critical in thinking through the forms of governance most appropriate to maintain equality in urban development outcomes. As McGuirk (2005) has argued in relation to the metropolitan level, the project of neoliberalism in Sydney has never been complete; rather, the state continually re-engages in distributive measures. Yet studies of development on the urban fringe tend to emphasise the elements of privatisation, rather than the ways in which states and markets interact. This leaves something of a gap when thinking through the role that the state might perform in these critical, and growing, suburban and inter-urban areas.

Drawing on two cases of large-scale residential planning and development we begin to trace the state-market relations underpinning Sydney’s suburban and inter-urban fringe. Drawing on interviews with planners, politicians and a range of secondary sources, the remainder of the paper explores the nature of state-market relations in each of our case studies. From this, we aim to use contemporary conceptualisations of hybrid forms of neoliberalism to identify the new boundaries of fringe governance in Sydney.

Our case studies
Our cases are of large scale residential property developments in NSW. They are both significant to state and local government land release targets and, at the time of planning, were expected to add 28 000 homes to Sydney’s outer-suburban dwelling stock. Our first case, Warnervale Town Centre (WTC), is a master-planned retail and services centre designed to anchor the expanding, largely private sector,
residential growth of the Wyong Shire. The WTC involves state and local government funding of both services and urban design features in a context of strong private sector pressure from national and local developers for land release; but with little private sector input. Private developers in this case were a relatively minor presence in the planning process, even though the development of the town centre was designed to underpin private residential development.

Our second case, the ADI-St Marys is more typical of the entrepreneurial-planning models that have characterised recent development. Located in Sydney’s outer-western suburbs on a disused military site, the planning process was co-ordinated by a large institutional developer that took a lead role in planning and financing residential and town centre development. While the NSW state government and the two relevant local councils maintained key roles in securing financial commitments and negotiating planning outcomes, ADI-St Marys signals stronger private sector involvement in planning and development than at Warnervale.

**The Warnervale Town Centre**

Warnervale is in one of the most rapidly developing areas of NSW – the Wyong Shire Council (WSC) in the commuter-region of the Central Coast. The Central Coast is emerging as a key suburban corridor between Sydney and the NSW regional centre of Newcastle. The Wyong Shire has experienced rapid population growth in the last 15 years, growing at a rate almost double the state average (NSW Premier’s Department, 2001). The Warnervale site was initially identified for residential release in the 1968 Sydney Regional Outline Plan, but not released until 1994 in response to increasing pressure from the development industry for residential land (Ruming, 2005). Unlike traditional fringe residential releases the Warnervale release area is divided into two distinct planning areas, which reflect both the privatisation thrusts of residential development and increasing master planned and state interventionist planning.

The first section of the Warnervale area was released under the management of Development Control Plan 49 (DCP49) (WSC, 2002a). DCP49 covers the southern section of the release area and is characterised by ‘traditional’ residential estate release, rarely exceeding 600 lots per estate, with blocks ranging in size from 450 to 750 square metres in size (WSC, 2002a). DCP49 was released in response to the increasing pressures from residential developers for land (Ruming, 2007). Developments comprise both land only and land and home packages, are largely devoid of alternative housing options, such as medium density dwellings. In recent years the plan has come under intense scrutiny by the local council, due to the perceived lack of community facilities and the relatively low levels of Section 94 contributions (Ruming, 2007). Simultaneously developers have criticised the release area due to the lack of preliminary council studies, such as environmental (as part of the land zoning process), which are currently denying development approval, and the lack of integration and coordination between private developers.

In stark contrast the northwest sector of Warnervale is designed to be a town centre of mixed use with social services and employment, implementing many of the initiatives intrinsic to the principles of New Urbanism (Ruming, 2005). The WTC is a state-led initiative, the subject of extensive master-planning funded and managed by various state institutions. To date the land has not been released to private development, with the majority of land in the region owned by state institutions (WSC, NSW Department of Transport, NSW Department of Planning) with other holdings by Landcom and a large supermarket chain. Public sector financial commitment comes to over $37 million compared to the private sector commitment of $8 million, which was generated through Section 94 contributions by developers in other parts of the Shire. In addition to public spending on rail, road and recreational facilities, this included the development of the Community Support and Human Services Strategy for Warnervale/Wadalba (CSHSSWW) (WSC, 2002b), a partnership between Wyong Shire Council and the Central Coast Regional Co-ordination Management Group (CCRCMG), and run primarily through Wyong Council and the NSW Premier’s Department. Under the CSHSSWW the NSW state provided $300 000 dollars over three years to employ a project co-ordinator and allocated $10 million over five years to the provision of social services in the north of Wyong Shire (WSC, 2002b).

With a range of financial commitments and co-ordination roles, the WTC looks like a relatively co-ordinated attempt by the state to invest in suburban infrastructure. The complex negotiations between the NSW state government and WSC nonetheless point to a degree of stickiness in this regard. Indeed, negotiations both under the CSHSSWW (WSC, 2002b) and the Central Coast Transport Action Plan (Transport NSW, 2002), saw council arguing for state government support based on existing service
needs within the Shire, rather than the future needs of the incoming population associated with DCP49 and WTC alone. Here, council enlisted the spatial and temporal specificities of a disadvantaged population, the dearth of social services and infrastructure, along with an uncoordinated private sector in order to attract state government funding to provide services that would benefit the Shire, rather than the expanding population (Ruming, 2005). The WTC thus emerges as a panacea for current, as much as future infrastructure shortfalls; where the activities and actions of the private sector are effectively taken-up by the local council in a broader project of shoring up investment from a higher public authority.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the agreements between the local and state government underpinning the funding commitments are relatively fragile. The $27 million commitment by the NSW Department of Transport for a new railway station plus additional funds to aid the construction of a transport exchange and $10 million to upgrade the major arterial road (Transport NSW, 2002) were the product of intense negotiation between council and the state departments. The spend remains a source of tension between state and local government; and construction has not commenced – despite an initial timeline which identified completion in 2007. This is the key source of concern for the local council as the infrastructure provided the catalysts for the most recent round of planning in the region, and was positioned as the primary driver in achieving the goals embedded in the New Urbanist development objectives of the strategy (Ruming, 2005). In an attempt to further ensure the success of service provision and community development objectives, $10 million was also provided by council for the construction of a community/aquatic centre. Critically, this is aided by $8 million of Section 94 contributions from the development community, drawn from other areas of Wyong, and channelled into the WTC.

The outcomes of this planning process have been slow to materialise. Despite commitments and planning procedures, work has not commenced on the site. The state appears in a rather fragile stand-off with the site now falling under a series of highly dictatorial master plans – the Warnervale District Planning Strategy released in March 2002 and the WTC master plan released in August 2004 – paid for by WSC and Landcom. The master plan processes was positioned as a partnership between the (state) landholders in the region. The planning partnership was formalised under a Project Control Group which, in close conjunction with the CCRCMG, developed the key themes of the strategy: increased community, infrastructure, services and employment. Once these strategies were agreed upon, the plans development was placed in the hands of WSC and Landcom, leaving the remaining state departments as essentially sign-off authorities. Importantly, many developers in the Warnervale region have welcomed the heavy state involvement in the region, as they believe the increased infrastructure will significantly aid the sale of their land (Ruming, 2007). In this sense, at Warnervale at least, direct intervention by a qualitative state is seen to increase both the supply of infrastructure and services, as well as financial profit to an external residential development market.

Despite the potential for greater development of these relations between the state and market, there is no question of the failure of the state to mobilise resources and underpin the services requirements of an expanding region: the case marks a relatively strong break-down in fringe development. The case certainly flags the limits of centralised funding of services; it marks their extent, ‘high price’ and their fragility. Yet, while the WTC marks a clear departure from Keynesian models of ‘big government’, it fits uncomfortably (also) with notions of state-market relations under neoliberalism. It is not an opposition between profit driven private sector and public authority that characterises this mode of fiscal austerity, but rather, relations between various levels of the state in which the neoliberalist tendency towards reduced spending unfolds. In short, the WTC turns attention to the neoliberalist qualities of the state. Indeed, it points to the ways in which neoliberalist tendencies manifest in relations between states, as much as between states and markets; and shows how in NSW, this brand of neoliberalism unfolds through local and state government interactions. This is exemplified with recent calls by the state government to resume planning powers over the WTC site in its entirety, removing any council authority.

**Australian Defence Industry site – St Marys**

In contrast, the planning and redevelopment of the ADI site at St Marys was characterised by relatively close interactions between the public planning authority, Planning NSW, and the private sector developer, Delfin Lend Lease (DLL). Unlike the land release covered by DCP49 at Warnervale, the ADI site had one public sector owner, the Commonwealth Department of Defence. The site, from 1941–1991, was used by the Department for the manufacture and testing of ammunition (El Khoury, 1998). With growing bi-partisan support at the national level for deregulation and privatisation of non-combat military operations,
the ADI, in 1991 sought to privatise its landholdings; profits would go towards the consolidation of its heavy engineering operations in Bendigo and to upgrade its holdings at Beralla, in Victoria (Senate Committee, 2000, p. 4).

A key step in the sale of the site for residential housing was its rezoning from a military to residential landuse. While local government in Australia has the authority to undertake such rezoning, the ADI site (1535 hectares) falls into two LGAs, the cities of Penrith and Blacktown. While the Commonwealth applied to both local councils for planning approval, the application was rejected in 1993 based (in part) on the level of works required to remediate the site, and in the case of Penrith City Council, reservations over the need for further land release in the LGA (Cook, 2006). With the rejection of the two local councils, authority to rezone the site was transferred to the NSW state government. Envisaging a difficult rezoning process, the Department, in 1994 sought the advice of the national property developer DLL to help negotiate the planning terrain. This engagement underpinned a high level of interaction between NSW Planning, the Commonwealth, and DLL.

Many of these interactions hinged on either securing or insuring the commitment of DLL. This is evident first, in the efforts of the public sector land-owners (the Commonwealth) and the public planning authority (Planning NSW) to shore-up commitment from the developer (DLL). This was achieved through an agreement (signed before the site was rezoned) that provided the site was rezoned, ensured its ownership would be transferred to the developer for $164 000 (Kelly, 2004).

Second, through the efforts of the NSW state government a relatively complex rezoning was negotiated. In order to rezone the site, NSW Planning was required to undertake a Regional Environmental Study (RES) As the ADI-St Marys site had been fenced off for over 50 years large tracts of the rare Cumberland Plain Woodland had been preserved. The significance of this remnant bushland was demonstrated in the draft RES which recommended 1100 hectares of the site be zoned ‘Regional Park’ (Penrith City Council 2000). Critically, NSW Planning had the authority to take this recommendation through to the final RES; this would ensure that all master plans submitted in response to the RES included a Regional Park of 1100 hectares. However, the state government opted to leave the size of the Regional Park unspecified in the final RES, thus allowing a ‘minimum’ interpretation by proponents. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 600 hectares zoned Regional Park in DLL’s October 1995 master plan, (submitted a month after the RES was released) came in at just over half the 1100 hectares recommended in the draft RES (Penrith City Council, 2000).

Despite these clear overtures to the private sector by the both the Commonwealth and NSW state government, there were also efforts to ensure human and hard infrastructure for members of the incoming and future community. Contributions from the developer, negotiated by the NSW state government and two local councils during a series of meetings required by Section 22 of the EPA Act (1979), included $100 million for open space and infrastructure, and an additional $6.9 million, paid by DLL to the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) to manage the Regional Park. After 12 months of negotiation, the final balance between housing and ecological outcomes came in at 5000 dwellings and a Regional Park of 630 hectares.

Despite the clear function of the Section 22 Committee in shaping DLLs contributions, the striking ecological balance achieved at the ADI site cannot be explained by these relations alone. Indeed, the case highlights the extension of state-market relations beyond the private sector and public bureaucracies to incorporate the civic realm (McGuirk' 2005, p. 68). Gaining momentum throughout the Section 22 negotiations was a strong campaign for conservation spear-headed for nearly 3 years by Penrith City Council, that while involved in Section 22 negotiations simultaneously sought Federal Government funding for the site (Penrith City Council, 1997). While these efforts were sustained, Council was unsuccessful in securing alternative funding, and eventually capitulated. However, the resident action group that had supported Council’s attempts to preserve the whole site (and who Council supported) continued to lobby their Federal Member, the honourable Jackie Kelly for the seat of Lindsay, who, in order to protect her seat in the 2001 Federal election campaigned on a platform of saving the ADI site. With her re-election, REP30 was modified (to a regional park of 900 hectares (ratified by the NSW Government in 2004).

Thus, while DLL’s investment was protected by state involvement, these relations were also filtered through an active civil society. While political intervention may be viewed with some scepticism, it highlights the multiple trajectories through which plans are made, revealing the very real ways in which
development outcomes may be modified, not only through formal mechanisms such as the Section 22 Committee, but through public participation. While blurring the boundaries between planning and politics, the outcome is impressive: the site achieves a notable balance between housing and ecological outcomes, including the preservation of the Cumberland Plain Woodland, a reasonably large land release and significant developer contributions.

Discussion
In light of the increasing tendencies towards broad neoliberal state economic instruments and the shift towards the private provision of infrastructure and social services (Troy, 1999), the Warnervale and ADI-St Marys sites seem to point to a series of contingencies unsettling the supposed inevitability of market dominance and state withdrawal. This exploration of fringe residential development suggests that development, in the context of spatially, temporally and institutionally contingent localities, is nonetheless mediated through an ‘ever present’ state (O’Neill, 1997) which operates within the confines of a multi-scaled, multi-objective state apparatus (McGuirk, 1997; 2003).

In order to compare the mediated specificities of residential development at both Warnervale and ADI-St Marys with the perceived archetype of privatised development, Table 1 summarises the actualities of development at the case study sites and compares these realities with an ‘expected’ form of residential development under a neoliberal frame. In this light, the expected form of neoliberalism, in terms of residential development and associated infrastructure provision, is characterised by three board trends:

a) Little state support in terms of funding for infrastructure. Infrastructure is positioned as the responsibility of the developers and builders of fringe sites (Caufield, 2000; Troy, 1999). The funding of infrastructure is to be provided either directly through the construction of individual sites, or provided to the state in the form of Section 94 contributions. Warnervale differs most from the expected norm with the majority of infrastructure being provided through state channels, with the assistance of some Section 94 contributions. With significant developer contributions, ADI-St Marys shows greater consistency with neoliberalist models but the ability of the NSW state government to ensure these commitments hinged on the earlier investment of the Commonwealth Government in land. Both cases therefore unsettle the hold of the private sector on suburban growth.

b) Local council involvement is expected to be variable, dependent on the specificities of the region (Ruming, 2005). However, in line with the apparent dearth of social services and infrastructure within fringe development, local councils tend to support developments on the provision that infrastructure requirements are met (Troy, 1999). Nevertheless, the role of council in the provision of these services and infrastructure can be expected to be low. Again, Warnervale differs most from the expected minimal role of the local council in development and service provision beyond its development approval role. In this case, while WSC supported development as the catalyst for service provision, it was also central in the design, management and implementation of a planning regime which structured private market operation and attempted to guarantee the provision of services and infrastructure. While both local councils at ADI-St Marys ultimately supported the final REP, they also moved to ensure they were not ‘played off’ by the developer, transferring their authority to the NSW state government, thus activating a three-way negotiation through the Section 22 Committee. PCC also launched a significant campaign to have the whole site preserved, making claims to the regional and national significance of the site; a move that ultimately led to the improved standing of the regional park and limitation of housing in the modified REP.30

c) Following points a) and b), the private sector is positioned as the principle provider of infrastructure and services (McGuirk and O’Neill, 2002; Troy, 1999). In the case of Warnervale, the role of the private sector in funding and providing infrastructure is relatively low, with contributions limited to those provided through Section 94 contributions. This minimal role of the private sector is primarily due to the land ownership pattern of the site – with multiple owners it is difficult for the state to identify the centralised private actors which to levy the cost of service and infrastructure provision. In contrast to the ideals of neoliberalism, issues of the capacity of the private sector to coordinate service provision across multiple ownership was also a significant factor in maintaining the central role of the state. In contrast, the ADI-St Marys case study offers a picture of significant service and infrastructure provision from the private sector, however, this provision is tied to development approval and site sale by the state and federal governments. In this instance, the level of service, infrastructure and environmental provisions, while large, are off-
set by the potential profit garnered from such a large land release in a market environment of dwelling scarcity and rapid house price inflation. The provision of services and infrastructure by the private sector is also offset by knock-on commercial patronage in the area for the developer. In both cases, the involvement of the private sector therefore hinges on significant state intervention, even if, as ADI-St Marys demonstrates, the nature of this involvement hinges on long term government investment in land stocks.

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<tr>
<th>State support for project</th>
<th>Warnervale</th>
<th>ADI-St Marys</th>
<th>‘Expected’</th>
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<tr>
<td>Role of the state government</td>
<td>Direct provision of infrastructure and services</td>
<td>Coordination role in terms of planning</td>
<td>Low levels of state intervention – services and infrastructure to be provided by the market/privatisation</td>
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<td>Support and role of the local Council</td>
<td>High level of support Council responsible for management and implementation of design principles</td>
<td>Low level of support – council believed development would be detrimental to their area</td>
<td>Most likely high support for the development due to increased infrastructure and services.</td>
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<td>Result – in terms of state involvement</td>
<td>High State Involvement</td>
<td>High State Involvement</td>
<td>Low State Involvement</td>
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<td>Contingent factors</td>
<td>Diverse ownership structure – resulting in problems of coordination</td>
<td>High levels of funding</td>
<td>Variable</td>
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<td></td>
<td>High population growth</td>
<td>Loss of income through subsidised sale of residential land</td>
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<td>Low levels of infrastructure</td>
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<td>High unemployment</td>
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<td>High social disadvantage</td>
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<td>Role of the private sector</td>
<td>Provision of minimal funds through Section 94 contributions</td>
<td>High direct funding – responsible for the provision of services and infrastructure</td>
<td>High funding</td>
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<td>Inability to coordinate large scale project</td>
<td>Potential for high profits through the sale of residential property and through increased patronage to commercial precinct (also owned by developer)</td>
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<td>Potential profit maximisation through increased land values</td>
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Table 1: WTC and ADI-St Marys versus the ‘expected’ neoliberal model

The case studies destabilise these tendencies of rolling-back and hollowing-out of the state (Larner, 2000). Instead, they present an increasingly ‘qualitative state’ which mediates and facilitates private development, as well as infrastructure and service provision (O’Neill, 1997). In both cases, private sector investment is cushioned by public sector commitments; the risks of large scale property development are off-set by the provision of infrastructure and the provision of cheap land. Yet the cases also show the different ways the state might intervene in development on the fringe. Indeed, while both sites fit more comfortably into qualitative notions of the state, they do not share the same development outcomes. The WTC has, for the moment, stalled, while development at ADI-St Marys has commenced. Thus the state-market relations underpinning development at the ADI-St Marys site provide some key markers for thinking through the role of the state in outer suburban and inter-urban contexts. ADI-St Marys highlights the critical role of state engagement with the property market. Here, the capacity of the NSW government to exact developer contributions hinged on the earlier ‘investment’ of the Commonwealth in 1535 hectares of land in the late 1940s. In addition, the single ownership at ADI-St Marys enabled direct negotiation with DLL through the Section 22 Committee, which saw the nature of the developers master plan change considerably, from 10 000 to 5 000 homes. This differs markedly from the capacity of the local and state government in Warnervale to regulate private involvement, despite recognition from developers that they would benefit from the WTC (Ruming, 2007). Further, there is little doubt that the ecological outcomes at ADI-St Marys hinged on the advocacy of both PCC and a mobilised civil society. This activates a much broader conception of ‘state’ involvement, moving beyond the planning authorities concerned with the development to a wider set of gatekeepers.

In both cases, there was little direct control by the ‘private’ sector. Indeed, the case study sites suggest that neoliberalist tendencies are not clearly articulated or only manifest in the withdrawal of the state against the private sector, but the withdrawing of regional states (for example Planning NSW) from local states (councils). Following McGuirk (2003; 2005) the cases suggest that neoliberalism moves slowly

848
through multiple forms, through the relations between local and state government; the intervention of states into planning processes; the objectives of market actors; the configuration of market players; and the characteristics of the development sites themselves. Here fringe development becomes a nexus of a multiplicity of scaled state and market institutional arrangements and objectives – all of which intermingle, mutate and materialise in the unique social, economic and environmental context of the development sites (McGuirk, 2003; 2005).

Conclusion
Hybrid forms of neoliberalism have been concerned with mapping the re-entry of state roles in supposedly market contexts (McGuirk, 2003). They not only point to the limits of neoliberalism, they also highlight the potential these offer in terms of reinscribing state roles. No universal theorisation of neoliberalism can expect to translate the specificities of the sites of expression and the multiplicity of factors which interact and manifest at these sites. While WTC and ADI-St Marys both represent large residential land developments on the fringe of Sydney, they offer vastly different translations of state and market interaction, neither of which aligns to the expected norm of a roll-out or roll-back neoliberal state – they are both ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’ (Brenner & Theodore, 2002b; Ruming, 2005).

By way of conclusion we do not advocate a return the welfare state, nor do we suggest that the market is the best and most efficient provider of social services and infrastructure tied to residential development. Rather, fringe development is a hybrid construction of state and market, each always influencing the other in the pursuit of development and service and infrastructure provision. Indeed, both case studies illustrate, to a certain extent, failed state/market configurations. In the case of Warnervale development remains to be initiated. This failure hinges primarily on the inability of the state (at all levels) to agree on, fund and implement a planning and infrastructure strategy. Here it could be argued that the market objectives of a private developer may have helped in facilitating development at Warnervale given an increased emphasis on the costs associated with land holdings and other commercial realties which push for a faster development turn-around, rather than on-going bureaucratic infighting tied to securing budget funding and aligning diverse departmental objectives. Similarly, the case of ADI-St Marys suggests that without a much broader notion of state roles, that includes multiple levels of government and extends planning control beyond a single planning authority, the possibility for economically and ecologically balanced suburban growth is limited.

References


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